INTRODUCTION
Incorporating a fixed factor such as land into an overlapping generations model may rule out dynamic inefficiency. The fact that overaccumulation of capital cannot occur in an economy with land can potentially have important effects on the conclusions drawn from simulated economies. Foṙ Ž . example, Imrohoroglu et al. 1995 find a beneficial role for an unfunded social security system in a model without a fixed factor where overaccumulation of capital plays an important role. Part of the benefit of the social security program in their model arises because social security substitutes for missing annuity markets, thus helping retirees allocate consumption over time in the face of uncertain lifespans. The insurance against lifespan uncertainty provided by social security can be viewed as helping agents achieve a more desirable age᎐consumption profile. Alternatively it can be viewed as helping society achieve a more efficient cross-sectional allocation of aggregate consumption at a point in time. In addition to these insurance effects, unfunded social security lowers the steady-state capital Ž . stock. Because the benchmark economy of Imrohoroglu et al. 1995 is dynamically inefficient in the absence of social security, this reduction in the capital stock increases aggregate consumption up to a replacement rate of between 10% and 20%. Beyond that point, increases in the replacement rate lower aggregate consumption, partially offsetting the benefits derived from a more efficient allocation. The maximum benefit of social security occurs at a replacement rate in the neighborhood of 30%. 1 Ž . This paper extends the findings of Imrohoroglu et al. 1995 by constructing a model with a fixed factor of production. Land is incorporated in a way that rules out dynamic inefficiency, so that we can determine whether the previously identified beneficial role of social security depends crucially on this feature of the model. 2 In this setup, as the capital stock increases toward the golden rule level, the rate of return on capital falls toward the growth rate of output, and the decline in the discount rate causes the price of land to increase. This increase in the price of land absorbs the saving of working cohorts and confers capital gains on the owners of land, inducing higher consumption. Because the price of land can increase without bound as the capital stock approaches the golden rule, this process is sufficient to rule out the overaccumulation of capital. Because dynamic inefficiency is impossible, an unfunded social security system in this framework unambiguously lowers aggregate consumption. However, it is unclear whether the insurance benefits of such a system outweigh the loss of aggregate consumption arising from even a small replacement rate.
In order to examine the role of social security in this economy with a fixed factor, we construct a model which consists of overlapping genera- 1 The effects of an unfunded social security system on capital accumulation and welfare Ž . have been studied extensively. For example , Feldstein 1985 argues that unless the proportion of myopic agents in an economy is large, the optimal social security replacement rate is Ž . quite low. Auerbach and Kotlikoff 1987 use an overlapping generations model with perfect foresight and complete markets and find that an unfunded system reduces the steady-state Ž . capital stock and welfare. Hubbard and Judd 1987 reach a similar finding using an overlapping generations model with uncertain lifetimes and liquidity constraints. Huang et al. Ž . Ž . 1997 and De Nardi et al. 1999 compute equilibrium transition paths across steady states in which the unfunded system is either reduced in size or completely eliminated. They find that the overall efficiency gains from reforming social security can be quite large despite the transient costs on currently alive generations. 2 
Ž
. Abel et al. 1989 provide evidence that the U.S. economy is dynamically efficient. IMROHOROGLU, IMROHOROGLU, AND JOINEṠ˘˙640 tions of 65-period-lived individuals facing mortality risk, individual income risk, and borrowing constraints. At any point in time there is a continuum of agents with total measure one. Private annuity markets and credit markets are closed by assumption. Until the mandatory retirement age, agents in this economy supply labor inelastically whenever they are given the opportunity to work. Agents who are not given the opportunity to work are unemployed and receive unemployment insurance. Agents in this economy accumulate assets to provide for old-age consumption and, because they face liquidity constraints, to self-insure against future income shocks. After retirement, agents receive social security benefits that are financed by a payroll tax on the employed agents.
In our model, social security provides two forms of risk sharing that are not available through the market. First, it provides a retirement annuity that can partially substitute for missing private annuities. Second, because the amount of this annuity is unrelated to an individual's employment or contribution history, social security entails some pooling of unemployment risk over and above that provided by explicit unemployment insurance. This second effect is unlikely to be large, however, because employment opportunities in our model are independent from one period to the next.
Individuals in this economy are heterogenous with respect to their age, employment status, and asset holdings. The return to asset holdings, the wage rate, and the price of land are determined by the profit-maximizing behavior of a firm with a constant returns to scale technology. There is no aggregate uncertainty, so the wage rate and the return to asset holdings are constant over time. We specify the optimization problem of the individual as a finite-state, finite-horizon, dynamic program and use numerical methods to compute stationary equilibria under alternative social security arrangements. We compare steady states with different social security arrangements and abstract from transitions between steady states. Ž . Our calibration procedure follows Cooley and Prescott 1995 and restricts the parameters of the model using measurements from the U.S. economy. For the purposes of this paper we view the U.S. national accounts as being generated by a three-factor, three-sector economy. The factors are land, labor, and capital. The sectors are the business, household, and government sectors. Because the national accounts do not directly report data on each of the nine income flows in this three-by-three framework, we rearrange the official data and make some imputations. We aggregate the data across all three sectors and calibrate the parameters of our one-sector model. These computations indicate that measured GDP is only about 60% as large as our comprehensive measure of output. The main reason for this discrepancy is that measured GDP includes only a small proportion of the return to factors employed in the household sector. The business sector accounts for about half of our measure of comprehen-sive output, the household sector for about one third, and government for about one sixth. The ratio of reproducible capital to comprehensive output averages 1.848, while on average the market value of land is 0.671 times as large as output.
Our results indicate that a newborn agent entering one of many steady states, indexed by replacement rates ranging from zero to unity, would prefer an economy with no unfunded social security to an economy with a positive replacement rate. The decline in average consumption resulting from lower saving more than outweighs the risk-sharing benefit of social security. Our negative findings on social security seem to be robust to reasonable perturbations in the parameters of the model. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model economy and Section 3 characterizes its stationary equilibrium. Section 4 discusses calibration of the model's parameters, while Section 5 summarizes the solution method. Section 6 uses the three-factor model to perform a quantitative analysis of the effects of an unfunded social security program. Section 7 concludes.
DESCRIPTION OF THE ECONOMY

Firms
The production technology of the economy is given by a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb᎐Douglas function,
Ž . Ž . where ␣ g 0, 1 is capital's share of output, g 0, 1 is labor's share, and K, N, and L are aggregate inputs of capital, labor, and land, respectively.
The total factor productivity parameter B ) 0 is assumed to grow at a constant, exogeneously given rate. The aggregate capital stock is assumed to depreciate at the rate of ␦.
3 Without loss of generality, the quantity of land can be normalized to unity. Given this normalization, the profit-maximizing behavior of the firm gives rise to first-order conditions which determine the net real return to capital and the real wage,
Go¨ernment
The only role of government in this economy is to administer unemployment insurance and social security programs, each of which is financed by 3 
Ž
. This production technology is identical to that of Hansen and Prescott 1993 . In addition, Ž . Meade 1962 presents a three-factor neoclassical growth model with land. a proportional tax on labor earnings. The particular social security ar-Ž . rangements in place are described by the pair , , which represents the s replacement rate and the payroll tax rate for social security. The unem-Ž . ployment insurance replacement ratio and the associated tax rate , u are also part of the government's policy specification. The only condition for choosing the policy instruments is that both the social security and the unemployment insurance systems be self-financing.
Households
The economy is populated by a large number of ex ante identical individuals who maximize the discounted expected lifetime utility
where ␤ is the subjective discount factor, is the conditional probability j of survival from age j y 1 to age j, c is the consumption of an age-j j individual, J is the maximum possible life span, and E is the expectations 0 operator conditional on information at the beginning of age 1. 4 The utility function is assumed to take the form
where ␥ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Each period, individuals who are below an exogenously given mandatory retirement age j U face a stochastic employment opportunity. Agents inelastically supply one unit of labor whenever they are given an opportu-Ä 4 nity to work. Let l g ⌳ s e, u denote the employment state, and assume that it follows a first-order Markov process. If l s e, the agent is employed; if l s u, the agent is unemployed. The transition function for the
Let w denote the wage rate in terms of the consumption good and ⑀ j denote the efficiency index of an age-j agent, normalized to have an average value of unity over the j U y 1 periods of the agent's working career. Before the retirement age of j U , an individual who is given the opportunity to work receives w e s w⑀ . If an individual is unemployed, he j j or she receives unemployment insurance benefits in the amount w u s w e , j j where is the replacement ratio. 4 By definition s 1 and s 0 for i ) J.
i
After the retirement age of j U the disposable income of a retiree is equal to the social security benefit, b. This benefit is calculated to be a fraction, , of some base income which we take as the average lifetime employed income. That is, 0, for j s 1, 2, . . . , j U y 1;
Note that an agent's social security benefit is independent of the agent's employment history. Under these assumptions the disposable income of an individual is given by
Ž .
In this economy, there is no private market for insurance against the risk of unemployment. In addition, there is no private annuities market that agents can use to smooth consumption in the face of an uncertain lifespan. Agents can accumulate assets to help smooth consumption over the life cycle, but they may not have negative net assets at any age.
5 These borrowing constraints can be stated as
where y is the end-of-period asset holdings of an age-j individual. An j Ž . implication of assumption 6 and the assumption s 0 for j ) J is that j individuals who are alive at age J will choose not to carry over any assets to the next period in the absence of a bequest motive, so y s 0.
J
Because some agents die before age J, we must adopt some technology for redistributing the assets of the deceased. We assume that each period the government distributes all accidental bequests equally among the members of all generations in the amount . In other words, equilibrium accidental bequests are distributed to all of the survivors in a lump-sum fashion. Ž . See Imrohoroglu 1989 and Dıaz-Gimenez and Prescott˘´Ž . 1992 learly, there are other distribution schemes that we could choose. Imrohoroglu et al. Ž . 1995 discuss the effects of adopting specific alternative schemes.
Given these assumptions, the budget constraint facing an individual can be written as c q y s 1 q r y, y given, 7
where r denotes the net rate of return on asset holdings. The consumer's problem has a recursive representation. For any begin-Ž . ning-of-period asset holding and employment status y, l define the con-Ž .
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Ž . straint set of an age-j agent ⍀ y, l g R as all pairs c , y such that
Ž . and constraints 4 , 5 , 6 , and 7 are satisfied.
We can represent the consumer's utility maximization problem as a finite-state, finite-horizon discounted dynamic program for which an opti-Ž . Ž . mal stationary Markov plan always exists. Let V y, l be the maximized j value of the objective function of an age-j agent with beginning-of-period Ž . Ž . asset holdings and employment status y, l . V y, l is defined as the
X subject to 4 ᎐ 8 , where the notation E means that the expectation is l over the distribution of l X .
STATIONARY EQUILIBRIUM
Steady-State Beha¨ior of Land and Capital
Population, and thus labor input, grows at a constant, exogenously given rate n. Likewise, the technology parameter B is assumed to increase at a constant rate . We assume that there exists a balanced growth path along which the capital-output ratio is constant. These assumptions imply that X Ž . Ž . output grows over time at the constant rate g s q n r 1 y ␣ and X w Ž that per capita output grows at the constant rate g s g y n s y 1 y . x Ž . ␣ y n r 1 y ␣ . Note that the discrete time counterpart to the growth X wŽ .Ž . x 1rŽ1y␣ . rate of output is g s 1 q 1 q n y 1. As there is no aggregate uncertainty in this economy, the rate of return on land in a steady state must equal the rate of return on capital, r. Each period, the economy's one unit of land is paid its marginal product, which Ž . equals 1 y ␣ y Q. The total return to land consists of this factor payment plus any increase in the price of land. Equating the rates of return on the two assets gives
where P denotes the price of land at the end of period t. Solving for the t price of land gives
Substituting recursively for future land prices gives the current land Ž . price as 1 y ␣ y times the discounted present value of all future output of the economy, where the rate of return to capital is the discount rate. This present value is finite only if the growth rate of output is less than the discount rate r, in which case
If r ) g X the economy is on a dynamically efficient growth path, whereas r -g X indicates overaccumulation of capital. In an overlapping generations economy without a fixed factor, a sufficiently high saving rate can lead to overaccumulation. In this economy with land, however, such dynamic inefficiency is not possible. As the capital stock increases toward the golden rule level, the rate of return on capital falls toward g X and the price of land increases. This increase in the price of land absorbs the saving of working cohorts and confers capital gains on the owners of land, inducing higher consumption. Because the price of land can increase without bound as the capital stock approaches the golden rule, this process is sufficient to rule out the overaccumulation of capital. 
Definition of Stationary Equilibrium
The time-invariant survival probabilities and the population growth j rate n imply a time-invariant age structure for the population. The share of age-j individuals in the population is given by the fraction , j s A stationary equilibrium for a given set of government policy parameters Ä 4 Ž . , , , is a collection of value functions V y, l , individual policy rules
Ž . variant measures of agent types y, l for each age j s 1, 2, . . . , J, j Ä 4 relative prices of labor and capital w, r , and a lump-sum transfer such that i. individual and aggregate behavior are consistent: iv. the commodity market clears,
where the initial wealth distribution of agents, Y , is taken as given; 0 Ž . v. the collection of age-dependent, time-invariant measures y, l j for j s 1, 2, . . . , J y 1, satisfies
where the initial measure of agents at birth, , is taken as given; 1 vi. the social security system is self-financing:
js1 y j j j vii. the unemployment insurance benefits program is self-financing: 
CALIBRATION OF THE MODEL ECONOMY
In order to obtain numerical solutions to the model, we must choose particular values for the parameters. We calibrate our model under the assumption that the model period is one year.
Technology Parameters
The parameters describing production technology are chosen to match long-run features of the U.S. economy along the lines suggested by Cooley Ž . and Prescott 1995 . The growth rate of per capita output, g, is set to 0.0165, which is the average growth rate of output per labor hour between Ž . 1897 and 1992. The remaining technology parameters ␣, , and ␦ are calculated from annual data since 1954.
Although our model is of a one-sector economy, we view the U.S. national accounts as being generated by a three-factor, three-sector economy. These sectors are the business, household, and government sectors. The first two sectors together are the private sector. This three-by-three framework results in an income flow Y for factor f in sector s, with f s f s K, N, and L, and s s b, h, and g. These nine income flows are shown schematically in Table I . Corresponding to each of these nine flows is a factor input. Because the national accounts do not directly report data on 
each of the income flows shown in Table I , it is necessary to rearrange the official data and to make some imputations. After calculating each income flow, we aggregate the data across all sectors to calibrate the parameters of our one-sector model. Details of these calculations appear in the Appendix. Table I shows the size of each of our nine income flows as a fraction of GDP. The official measure of GDP is only about 60% as large as our comprehensive output measure. The business sector accounts for about half of comprehensive output, and the household sector about one-third. The ratio of reproducible capital to comprehensive output averages 1.848, while on average the market value of land is 0.671 times as large as output.
As described in the Appendix, our calculations imply factor shares of 0.690, 0.277, and 0.033 for labor, capital, and land, respectively, and an aggregate depreciation rate of capital of 0.069. The technology parameter Ž .
X B, which grows at a rate of 1 y ␣ g y n, is normalized to 1.005 in the model's ''base period.'' This value results in an output of 1.0 given a capital stock of 1.848. Per capita quantities in this economy grow at a rate of g per period. All per capita quantities reported below are for the model's hypothetical base period. 
Demographic and Labor Market Parameters
Individuals are assumed to be born at the real-time age of 21, and they can live a maximum of J s 65 years. After age 85, death is certain. 9 The Ä 4 J sequence of conditional survival probabilities is taken from Faber growth rate of the population, which has averaged 1.2% per year in the United States over the last 50 years. The mandatory retirement age is taken to be j U s 45, which corresponds to a real-time age of 65. The Ä 4 efficiency index ⑀ is calibrated using money earnings for full-time male j and female workers.
10 Given an employment rate of 94%, the aggregate labor input is computed as N s 0.94Ý Table 30 . The index is normalized to average unity between j s 1 and j s j U y 1; after j s j U y 1 we assume that ⑀ s 0. j 30% of the employed wage. The employment transition probabilities are chosen to make the probability of employment equal to 0.94, independent of the availability of the opportunity in the previous period. The transition probabilities matrix is then given by 0.94 0.06
Ž .
0.94 0.06
Preference Parameters
In line with recent practice, we set the preference parameters ␤ and ␥ so as to match the economy's observed wealth accumulation behavior as measured by the empirical wealth᎐output ratio. This single ratio is not sufficient to pin down the values of both preference parameters. There seems to be a wide range of empirical estimates for the intertemporal Ž . elasticity of substitution, 1r␥. Mehra and Prescott 1985 cite various empirical studies which suggest that the coefficient of relative risk aversion, ␥ , is between 1 and 2. We take ␥ s 2.0 as our base case and also Ž . report results for the cases where ␥ ranges between 1.0 log utility and 5.0. For ␥ s 2.0, we find that ␤ s 0.978 results in a wealth᎐output ratio of 2.521, compared with the empirical average of 2.519 since 1954.
11 Although the unemployment rate of 0.06 is close to the postwar U.S. average, the duration clearly exceeds that in the U.S. economy. A possible remedy for this is to shorten the model period from one year to one quarter, at the expense of quadrupling the computational burden. Incorporating persistence in unemployment would further increase its average duration.
12 Our calibration procedure imputes a return to labor in the household sector, whereas in the model we treat all labor income as arising from work in the market sector. In particular, unemployment results in the loss of all labor income other than unemployment benefits, and labor income is zero after retirement. The first of these facts tends to overstate the degree of labor income risk, raising the precautionary saving of liquidity constrained agents. Earlier work indicates that precautionary saving is relatively small in our model, so this effect probably has little influence on our findings. Assuming that agents continue to receive labor Ž . income corresponding to household production after retirement would, at given parameter values, result in lower retirement saving than the models reported in our tables. Thus, the economy would be further below the golden rule capital stock in the absence of social security, making it even less likely that the insurance benefits of an unfunded system would outweigh the loss of aggregate consumption. We could alter the values of preference parameters to maintain a target wealth᎐output ratio of 2.519, but results reported in Table V indicate that a positive replacement rate is never optimal when these preference parameters are varied in such a way that the economy still hits this target wealth᎐output ratio. For these reasons, we conclude that failure to model separate earnings processes for market and household work is unlikely to overturn our finding that the optimal social security replacement rate is zero.
While this calibration of preference parameters results in a model that replicates the economy's observed wealth accumulation behavior, our measured wealth᎐output ratio of 2.519 is considerably smaller than the empirical measurements generally reported in the literature. For example, Ž . Ž . Auerbach and Kotlikoff 1987 , p. 64 , Cooley and Prescott 1995 , p. 21 , Ž . and Laitner 1992 . 154 report ratios of 3.5, 3.32, and 3.15, respectively. The difference between these measurements and ours arises largely from differences in the measurement of output rather than wealth. Most measures of income exclude one or more of the nine income flows shown in Table I . The three studies cited here exclude the return to labor in the household sector, which is large relative to official GDP, while including much or all of the return to land and capital in the household sector. The return to labor in the household sector is undoubtedly measured less accurately than many components of official GDP. We assume labor's share in household production to be 0.68, which is slightly lower than the labor share of 0.71 that we measure for the market sector. Setting the labor share in household production to zero results in a measured wealth᎐output ratio of about 3.4, which is close to the ratios commonly reported. A labor share of 0.5 or larger results in a wealth᎐output ratio below 3.0, and a labor share of 0.6 gives a wealth᎐output ratio of about 2.7, which is close to our measured ratio of 2.5.
Because our inclusion of labor income in the household sector results in a target wealth᎐output ratio substantially lower than that generally assumed in the literature, we also report results with ␤ s 1.011 and ␥ s 2.0. These parameter values are taken from the model of Imrohoroglu, Ž . Imrohoroglu, and Joines 1995 , where they resulted in a wealth᎐output ratio of 3.48. This alternative parameterization can be viewed as arising from a calibration procedure which assumes that no labor income is generated in the household sector. Table II summarizes the parameter values of our benchmark model. is set so that it is never binding, typically a value of 20 to 30 times the annual income of an employed agent. Note that with our choice of m s 4097 the state space has 4097 = 2 points for individuals who are young and 4097 = 1 points for retired individuals. The control space is 4097 = 1 for all individuals. The discrete-state numerical method used in this paper is quite standard. 13 We start with a guess for the aggregate capital shock and the accidental bequests, solve the individuals' dynamic program with a backward recursion, obtain the distribution of the individuals with a forward recursion, compute the aggregate quantities and check whether they are close to the initial guesses. If so, we have a stationary equilibrium; if not, we iterate on this procedure until convergence. Figure 1 displays the fixed point problem in our benchmark economy and in a similarly calibrated economy without land.
SOLUTION METHOD
FINDINGS
Some Properties of an Economy with Land
In this section we report the results of several experiments that illustrate the potential importance of a fixed factor of production and of the calibration choices made in Section 4. The most important of these choices is the inclusion of labor income in the household sector, which gives a larger measure of comprehensive output than that used by most other 13˙Ž .
Ž . See Imrohoroglu et al. 1993 , Imrohoroglu 1998 , and the ''Practical DynamicŽ . Programming'' chapter in Ljungqvist and Sargent 1997 . authors and results in a correspondingly lower wealth᎐output ratio. This method of measuring the wealth᎐output ratio affects the choice of the preference parameters ␤ and ␥.
Our first set of simulations compares the steady states of economies with identical technologies but different preferences toward saving, as measured by ␤. We consider economies with 0.95 F ␤ F 1.04. The other parameters are as described in Section 4 above, and the social security replacement rate is set at 0.30. The golden rule capital stock for these economies is 3.34. Figure 2 compares wealth accumulation across economies with different subjective discount factors. As ␤ increases from one economy to the next, agents accumulate more wealth, but the division of this wealth between land and capital is not constant across economies. With ␤ s 0.95, the capital stock is 1.44 and the market value of land is 0.39. Total wealth and the market value of land increase with ␤, and at an increasing rate. The capital stock also increases, but the rate of increase slows as capital approaches the golden rule. Total wealth equals the golden rule capital stock at ␤ s 1.0, which is within the range of empirical estimates reported in the literature. If all wealth had to take the form of reproducible capital, then a simulated economy with ␤ greater than 1.0 and all other parameters set to the values given in Section 4 would be dynamically inefficient.
FIG. 2. Steady-state capital and wealth.
In an economy with land, however, the share of land in total wealth rises with ␤, and overaccumulation of capital does not occur. The market value of land does not exceed the value of capital until ␤ reaches 1.032, which is higher than the empirical estimates with which we are familiar.
It should be emphasized that a ␤ of 0.978 results in a wealth᎐output ratio of 2.521, compared with the empirical average of 2.519 since 1954. Not only does this value of ␤ replicate total wealth, it also closely matches the split between land and capital. The simulated land᎐output and capital᎐output ratios are 0.662 and 1.859, respectively, compared with the empirical values of 0.671 and 1.848.
Based on wealth᎐output ratios in the neighborhood of 3.4, some previous authors have concluded that standard life-cycle models have difficulty generating empirically plausible amounts of wealth accumulation. Given a sufficiently low rate of time preference, of course, the standard model can generate wealth᎐output ratios of 3.4 or larger. This consideration has led several authors to use negative rates of time preference in their models, which is itself a source of some controversy.
14 The conclusion that the life-cycle model cannot account for observed wealth accumulation, how- Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu, and Joines 1995 , Huggett 1996 , and Rıos-Rull 1996 . who take ␤ s 1.011, based on empirical estimates of Hurd 1989 . ever, depends on the mapping between model quantities and their empirical counterparts. Using the mapping described in Section 4, which yields a wealth᎐output ratio of 2.519, the standard model can replicate empirical wealth᎐output ratios using positive rates of time preference.
Optimal Social Security Arrangement
The fact that overaccumulation of capital does not occur in our economy with land, even at negative rates of time preference, can potentially have important effects on the conclusions drawn from using this model economy to simulate policy experiments. For example, Imrohoroglu et al. Ž . 1995 find a beneficial role for an unfunded social security system that replaces as much as 30% of average lifetime earnings. The benefits of social security arise partly because such a system reduces saving, thereby eliminating the dynamic inefficiency that would otherwise exist. In addition, social security permits agents to improve the intertemporal allocation of consumption in the face of uncertain lifespans. It is unclear whether this insurance benefit alone is large enough to outweigh the negative effects of a lower capital stock in an economy where dynamic inefficiency does not occur.
In this subsection we conduct several experiments designed to examine this question within our three-factor model. In these experiments, the social security replacement rate, , is the major policy instrument. We Ž . search over values of g 0, 1 in an attempt to find the optimal benefit level given various combinations of parameter values.
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Our first experiment examines the effects of alternative social security replacement rates in an economy with all parameter set to the benchmark values given in Section 4 above. In particular, the preference parameters ␤ and ␥ are set to 0.978 and 2.0, respectively. Table III reports characteristics of the steady state of this economy. As the social security replacement rate increases from 0.0 to 1.0, the economy's steady-state capital stock, consumption, output, and utility all decline. The interest rate is greater than the growth rate of aggregate output at all replacement rates, indicating that this economy is dynamically efficient with or without social security. This experiment indicates that a newborn agent entering one of these steady states would prefer an economy with no unfunded social security to an economy with any positive replacement rate. The effect of unfunded social security in depressing the capital stock more than out-15 These replacement rates are for total labor income, including labor income in the household sector, whereas benefits in the U.S. social security system depend on earnings in the market sector. Table I indicates that earnings in the market sector are 62% of total labor income. Thus, the replacement rates in Tables III᎐V should be divided by 0.62 to convert them into replacement rates for market earnings. weighs the insurance benefits of such a system in substituting for private annuity markets, which are absent from the model. The absence of a beneficial role for social security in Table III may depend on the preference parameters ␤ and ␥ as well as on the presence of land. In a model with a ␥ of 2.0, a ␤ of 0.98, and no fixed factor, Ž . Imrohoroglu, et al. 1995 find neither dynamic inefficiency nor a beneficial role for social security. Thus, the results in Table III do not prove the importance of a fixed factor in eliminating a positive role for social security.
To identify the role of land, we must examine an economy in which dynamic inefficiency would be possible in the absence of a fixed factor. The values of the preference parameters in Table III were chosen to match a wealth᎐output ratio of 2.519, which is lower than that commonly found in the literature. An economy where ␤ is chosen to match the higher wealth᎐output ratios more commonly reported can generate dynamic inefficiency. Several authors have used a ␤ of 1.011, whicḣ Ž . Imrohoroglu et al. 1995 report generates wealth᎐output ratios close tȏ 3.5. We now report results of experiments using this alternative calibration. Table IV examines the effects of unfunded social security in two hypothetical economies that differ only in the existence of a fixed factor of production. Columns 2 through 5 report the results for an economy with no fixed factor and with ␤ s 1.011. In other respects, the calibration of this economy is like that in the benchmark model of Table III . In particular, labor's share parameter remains 0.690, and capital's share parameter ␣ is increased to 0.310, reflecting the assumption that all property income accrues to capital. With a replacement rate of zero, the Ž interest rate is less than the growth rate of aggregate output 2.87% per . year , indicating that this economy is dynamically inefficient in the absence of social security. Dynamic inefficiency disappears at a replacement rate of about 13%, whereas the expected lifetime utility of a newborn individual entering this economy is maximized at a replacement rate of 16%.
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To isolate the effects of the fixed factor alone, we add land to this model while keeping ␤ set at 1.011. Columns 6᎐9 of Table IV report the effects of social security in this economy. As theory predicts, there is no dynamic inefficiency even in the absence of social security. Furthermore, the expected utility calculations indicate that a newborn individual entering this economy would prefer a replacement rate of zero to any positive replacement rate. These results confirm that the disappearance of a beneficial role for unfunded social security does not depend on whether the subjective discount factor is set to 0.0978 or 1.011. A fixed factor of production that is paid 3.3% of aggregate output is sufficient not only to rule out dynamic inefficiency, but also to eliminate the welfare-enhancing effects of unfunded social security.
Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution
We now examine whether our findings on the effects of unfunded social security are robust to alternative assumptions about the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1r␥. This parameter can potentially affect our conclusions through two channels. In our model, the primary source of 16 In terms of market-sector earnings, these figures correspond to replacement rates oḟ Ž . 21% and 26%, which are close to the replacement rates reported in Imrohoroglu et al. 1995 . welfare gains from social security is the ability of such a system to substitute for private annuity markets in helping individuals allocate consumption intertemporally in the face of uncertain lifespans. The larger is ␥ , the more risk averse are individuals, the stronger is their desire to smooth consumption, and the greater is the potential welfare cost of impoverishment in old age. Thus, other things equal, a larger ␥ increases the scope for welfare gains from social security.
The welfare costs of unfunded social security arise from the depressing effect of such a system on the steady-state capital stock. This effect, and thus the potential welfare loss from social security, also rises with ␥. A larger ␥ implies a lower intertemporal density of substitution in consumption and thus a lower interest sensitivity of saving. Unfunded social security reduces saving at any interest rate. For a given production technology, and thus a given marginal product of capital schedule, the reduc-Ž tion in the steady-state capital stock and the increase in the equilibrium . interest rate is greater the less interest-sensitive the saving schedule. Thus, a higher ␥ implies a larger effect of unfunded social security on the capital stock.
In Section 4, we argued that the preference parameters ␤ and ␥ should be chosen so that the model's steady-state wealth᎐output ratio matches its empirical counterpart. Because two parameters can be varied to match this single ratio, there exists a locus of ␤᎐␥ pairs each of which results in a simulated wealth᎐output ratio close to the empirical target of 2.519, given a social security replacement rate of 40%. 17 In all results reported to this point, we have fixed ␥ at 2.0. We now examine whether our findings on the effects of social security are robust to alternative values of ␥ , each of which is paired with a value of ␤ chosen to match our target wealth᎐out-put ratio.
The wealth᎐output ratio in our model economy is positively related to the discount factor ␤ and negatively related to the risk aversion coefficient ␥. This fact gives rise to a positively sloped locus of points in ␤᎐␥ space, each of which closely matches the empirical wealth᎐output ratio of 2.519. Given a value of ␥ in an infinite-horizon, representative-agent model, one can analytically solve for the ␤ required to match a given wealth᎐output ratio. No such analytical solution is available in our incomplete markets framework. Instead, we search over values of ␤ in increments of 0.001 to find the value that best matches observed wealth᎐output ratios. In this search, we set other parameters to the values described above and use a social security replacement rate of 40% and an unemployment insurance 17 Because the division of wealth between land and capital depends only on technology parameters, each of these ␤᎐␥ pairs also matches the empirical land᎐output and capital᎐output ratios.
replacement ratio of 30%. For 1 -␥ -5, the resulting locus of ␤᎐␥ pairs is nearly linear, with ␤ s 0.9392 q 0.0192␥ . Table V reports the effects of different replacement rates on the capital stock for five combinations of ␤ and ␥ . With ␥ s 5.0, increasing the replacement rate from zero to 100% reduces the steady-state capital stock Ž . by 43%. With log utility ␥ s 1.0 , this same policy change reduces the capital stock by only 11%. Although the higher intertemporal elasticity of substitution implied by log utility results in a smaller reduction in the capital stock, this reduction is still large enough to outweigh the risk-sharing benefits of social security. This result is even stronger with lower elasticities of substitution, so that expected lifetime utility is highest at a replacement rate of zero for each combination of preference parameters. In this sense, our findings are indeed robust to alternative assumptions about the values of these parameters.
CONCLUDING REMARKṠ
Ž . This paper extends the findings of Imrohoroglu et al. 1995 by constructing a model with a fixed factor of production such as land. By enabling agents to hold wealth in a form other than reproducible capital, land alters the capital accumulation properties of the model, in particular, ruling out dynamic inefficiency. We use this three-factor model to study the extent to which earlier quantitative results on the optimality of social security depend on the absence of a fixed factor.
We view the U.S. national accounts as being generated by a three-factor, three-sector economy. The factors are land, labor and capital. The sectors are the business, household, and government sectors. We aggregate the data across all three sectors and calibrate the parameters of our one-sector model. Because the national accounts do not directly report data on each of the nine income flows in our three-by-three framework, we rearrange the official data and make some imputations. These computations indicate that GDP is only about 60% as large as our comprehensive measure of output. The main reason for the divergence of GDP from comprehensive output is that we augment measured output to include the return to labor in the household sector. The business sector accounts for about half of comprehensive output, and the household sector about one-third. The ratio of reproducible capital to comprehensive output averages 1.848, while on average the market value of land is 0.671 times as large as output.
Using this model to compare the steady states of economies with different social security replacement rates, we find that a newborn agent would prefer being born into an economy with no unfunded social security to an economy with any positive replacement rate. Because the existence of a fixed factor rules out dynamic inefficiency, an unfunded social security system unambiguously lowers aggregate consumption. At the same time, social security provides insurance services by substituting for missing annuity markets, thus helping elderly agents smooth consumption in the face of uncertainty about the time of death. Our findings indicate that these insurance gains are insufficient to offset the effects of lower lifetime consumption caused by unfunded social security. These negative findings on social security are robust to alternative assumptions about the magnitude of preference parameters.
The values of these preference parameters are chosen so that the model replicates the economy's observed wealth᎐output ratio, and our target ratio of 2.519 is considerably smaller than the empirical measurements generally reported in the literature. The difference between these measurements and ours arises largely from our inclusion of the return to household labor in our measure of output. We assume labor's share in household production to be 0.68, which is slightly lower than the labor share of 0.71 that we measure for the market sector. Setting the labor share in household production to zero results in a measured wealth᎐out-put ratio of about 3.4, which is close to the ratios commonly reported, whereas a labor share of 0.5 or larger results in a wealth᎐output ratio below 3.0.
Based on wealth᎐output ratios in the neighborhood of 3.4, some previous authors have concluded that standard life-cycle models have difficulty generating empirically plausible amounts of wealth accumulation without assuming negative rates of time preference. The conclusion that the life-cycle model cannot account for observed wealth accumulation, however, depends on the mapping between model quantities and their empiri-cal counterparts. Using the mapping described in Section 4 above, we find that the standard model can replicate empirical wealth᎐output ratios using positive rates of time discount.
APPENDIX
Calculation of Factor Shares and Wealth᎐Output Ratio
Our procedure for filling in the cells in Table I can be summarized as follows. First, we fill in the lower, right-hand cell of the table by taking labor income in the government sector, Y , from the National Income N g and Product Accounts. Then we subtract gross housing product from GDP to obtain the gross product of the business sector. We allocate gross business product among the three factors along the lines described by Ž . Cooley and Prescott 1995 , thus completing the top row of the table. We use the income flow to land and capital in the business sector, together with data on the corresponding stocks of land and capital, to calculate a common net rate of return on land and capital. Assuming that this rate of return also applies to land and capital in the government sector, we can use data on the stocks of government land and capital to calculate the corresponding income flows, thus completing the bottom row of the table. The income of land and capital in the household sector consists of the property share of gross housing product plus the income flow from consumer durables, which is computed using the common net rate of return on assets and data on the stock of consumer durables. Finally, labor income in the household sector is computed using the previously calculated income of household land and capital together with an assumption, Ž . based on Greenwood et al. 1995 , about the share of labor in household production.
Besides data on each of the nine income flows, our calibration procedure requires data on capital and land inputs in each sector, denoted K s and L , respectively. Because labor is inelastically supplied in our model, Table 22 . Data on business-sector and household land are from the same source as inventories. The value of governmentowned land is inferred from the value of privately owned land and calculations reported in Ž . Goldsmith 1982, Tables 24, 77 , and 79 of the ownership distribution of land.
We begin by calibrating labor and property shares along lines similar to Ž . those in Cooley and Prescott 1995 . Later, we divide property income between capital and land.
Labor's share in the business sector can be calculated from items reported directly in the national accounts. 19 The gross product of the business sector is Along a balanced growth path, the capital᎐output ratio is constant, so this equation becomes 1 q g X k s 1 y ␦ k q x, Ž . Ž .
and the depreciation rate becomes ␦ s xrk y g X , where k is the capital᎐output ratio and x is the investment᎐output ratio for the type of capital under consideration.
Calculating the depreciation rate for durables in this manner results in a value of 0.207. Using this depreciation rate, property income in the household sector is
We have no data on labor's share in household production. Greenwood Ž . et al. 1995 which we find to be 0.690. Solving for the aggregate depreciation rate from data on the aggregate Ž stock of reproducible capital including inventories, consumer durables, . and government capital and the corresponding investment gives a depreciation rate of 0.069.
Having derived the labor and property share in total output, we then divide the property share between land and capital. Along a balanced growth path, capital's share of total output is given by 1 y q ␦ q g X PrY Ž
.Ž .
Here, P is the total value of land, Y is the comprehensive measure of output, and K is the stock of reproducible capital. This formula results in shares of 0.277 and 0.033 for capital and land, respectively.
